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Abstract 
Social Realism (SR), as a movement that argues for ‘bringing knowledge back in’ to 
curriculum (Young 2008), is significant globally, especially in South Africa. This 
article examines arguments from SR proponents that curriculum selection should 
privilege specialised disciplinary knowledge—as ‘powerful knowledge’—over 
‘everyday knowledge’, and how this is warranted through Durkheim’s distinction 
between ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ social bases for knowledge. The article asks how 
adequately curriculum based on SR warrants can do social justice. This inquiry stages 
debates between SR and three alternative approaches. The first is standpoint theories 
that knowledge—including that of scientific disciplines—is always positional and 
‘partially objective’. The next is Vygotskian arguments for curriculum that, 
dialectically, joins systematising powers of scientific knowledge with rich funds of 
knowledge from learners’ everyday life-worlds. Third, SR’s philosophical framing is 
contrasted with Nancy Fraser’s (2009) framework for robust social justice in 
globalising contexts. It is argued that SR’s grounds for curriculum knowledge 
selection emphasise cognitive purposes for schooling in ways that marginalise ethical 
purposes. In consequence, SR conceptions of what constitutes social-educational 
‘justice’ are too thin, we argue, to meet substantive needs and aspirations among 
power-marginalised South African groups seeking better lives through schooling. 
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Calling knowledge back 
A global educational development across many nations has seen calls to regain focus 
on issues of knowledge in curriculum. Key players include ‘Social Realists’ 
(henceforth SRs) such as Young, author of a key book (2008a) articulating the call in 
its title: Bringing knowledge back In, among others (e.g. Yates, Collins & O’Connor 
2011; Biesta 2014; Pinar 2014). SRs and others argue that decades of ‘student 
centred’ and ‘process’ orientations have under-emphasised issues of what knowledge 
should/should not be core in curriculum, and why. South Africa’s recent national 
curriculum—Curriculum Assessment Policy Statements (CAPS)—is significantly 
influenced by these arguments, although many South African policy makers, 
academics and teachers may not be aware of SR as an intellectual movement.    
 
The country’s broader political context from the late 1990s led government policy 
actors to engage with key SR advocates in academia, and ultimately to adopt SR 
orientations in school curriculum and teacher education. This opening to SR arose as 
inadequacies became apparent in the outcomes-based education (OBE) framework put 
in place in the Curriculum 2005 reform (Fataar 2006). In this reform, what had been 
post-apartheid impulses for curriculum to include the cultural knowledges of those 
who had been educationally marginalised or disenfranchised during apartheid lapsed 
into emphasis on banal ‘everyday competencies’, for example ‘driving a car, tying 
your shoelaces, cooking rice’ (Hoadley & Jansen 2009:181). SR arguments to centre 
curriculum on ‘powerful knowledge’ gained impetus as policy makers (mis)read this 
to address ‘education needed for the global knowledge economy’, as the means to 
national technological and economic growth. As well, providing such knowledge ‘to 
all’ was touted as distributing social justice to population groups that had been 
disenfranchised from access to empowering education under apartheid.  
 
 3 
We agree with calls for renewed foregrounding of knowledge selection questions in 
relation to curriculum when considering issues of social change and critical praxis. 
Yet we find that SR arguments shunt aside important ways of thinking about 
knowledge, power and curriculum that matter for socially just educational work. This 
paper aims to unpack underlying assumptions in the SR position. To do so, we stage 
key debates between SR and three alternative approaches. The first is standpoint 
theories that knowledge—including that of scientific disciplines—is always positional 
and so never more than partially ‘objective’. Next, drawing on the work of Moll 
(2014), we challenge SR with Vygotskian arguments for curriculum that, 
dialectically, joins systematising powers of scientific knowledge with rich funds of 
knowledge from learners’ everyday life-worlds. Third, SR’s philosophical 
underpinnings are contrasted with Nancy Fraser’s (2009) framework for robust social 
justice in globalising contexts. We argue that SR warrants for what knowledge should 
and should not feature in curriculum over-stress epistemological (cognitive) purposes 
for schooling, in ways and degrees that marginalise axiological (ethical) purposes. In 
consequence, SR conceptions of what constitutes social-educational ‘justice’ are too 
thin, we argue, to meet substantive needs and aspirations among power-marginalised 
groups, in South Africa and elsewhere, for better lives through schooling.  
 
In staging these debates on the warrants for curriculum knowledge selection, we work 
closely with key SR texts.  Our goal is to offer a robust but respectful critical reading 
of core SR assumptions, and to offer alternative curriculum warrants, which can 
contribute to ongoing debates about social justice and curriculum praxis.   
 
SR’s social-ontological basis for privileging ‘powerful knowledge’ 
In debates about curriculum knowledge selection, SRs argue that we must distinguish 
‘between two ideas, knowledge of the powerful and powerful knowledge’ (Young 
2008b:13-14), and give value emphasis to the latter. As Young (2008b:14) puts it: 
 
Knowledge of the powerful … has its roots in Marx’s … well-known 
dictum that the ruling ideas at any time are the ideas of the ruling 
class…. However … [this] tells us nothing about the knowledge 
itself…. [W]e need another concept … [that] refers not to the 
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backgrounds of those who have most access to knowledge or who give 
it legitimacy … [but] to what the knowledge can do or what intellectual 
power it gives…. Powerful knowledge provides more reliable 
explanations … for engaging in political, moral, and other kinds of 
debates…. In modern societies, powerful knowledge is, increasingly, 
specialized knowledge; and schooling, from this perspective, is about 
providing access to the specialized knowledge that is embodied in 
different knowledge domains. 
 
A persuasive argument here is not to sacrifice the value of knowledge that has been 
hard-wrought by specialist disciplinary communities, by dismissing it as merely or 
primarily ‘power-knowledge’: i.e. knowledge made powerful by the arbitrariness of 
historical struggles in which certain social-structural positions gain upper hands over 
others to shape curriculum. It is important to consider how knowledge can be 
empowering in its own right, apart from the arbitrariness by which ‘winners’ in power 
struggles can promote their ways of knowing relative to others. Indeed, as critical 
sociologists of education, we are specialists who would not devalue our hard work to 
advance knowledge about structural inequality as simply an arbitrary view. We thus 
share something of Young’s valuation about ‘more reliable explanations’ that provide 
greater ‘intellectual power’ to engage in political and moral domains of social life. 
(See also Wheelahan’s arguments (2010; 2013) that ‘powerful knowledge’ provides 
those in adult education with critical-analytical power, beyond mere skills and facts, 
to read the social worlds of their practice.)  
 
However, we demur regarding how SR warrants ‘powerful knowledge’ to deserve 
overwhelming centrality in curriculum, due—in their argumentation—to a ‘sacred’ 
esteem accorded to the ‘truth’ value of knowledge generated by those in specialist (or 
disciplinary) communities. Says Young (2008a:31-32): 
 
[T]he objectivity of knowledge is in part located in the social networks, 
institutions and codes of practice built up by knowledge producers over 
time. It is these networks of social relations that, in crucial ways, 
guarantee truth claims, and give the knowledge that has [been] 
produced its emergent powers…. [S]pecialist forms of social 
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organization remain the major social bases for guaranteeing the 
objectivity of knowledge. 
 
This claim for the ‘truth’ value of specialist knowledge goes against many decades of 
constructivist epistemology in the sociology of knowledge, as indicated in the subtitle 
of Young’s book (2008a) Bringing knowledge back in: From social constructivism to 
social realism in the sociology of education. The adjective ‘social’, prefixed to 
‘realism’, is important: specialist knowledge is not transcendental but socially 
generated. Yet, while SRs agree that socially generated knowledge can never yield 
unmitigated, transparent truth about social ‘realities’, their claim is serious about 
specialist communities as the social locus that guarantees progressively greater 
approximations of objective truth. This claim applies to both natural and social 
science disciplines (with recognition of greater limitations on the truth-value of social 
science knowledge). 
 
On what basis can specialist knowledge achieve such rarefied power-of-truth? After 
all, do we not find that actually practising communities of specialist knowledge, 
situated in given times and places, typically consist far more of men, and/or those 
who are white, and/or born to families of relatively powerful socio-economic status, 
etc? Are there no partialities of perspective in such imbalances of membership? 
Indeed, Young himself ‘in no way denies that the production and transmission of 
knowledge is always entangled with a complex set of contending social interests and 
power relations’ (2008a:31). We read this to acknowledge that actually practising 
knowledge communities encounter contestations both from outside and within. So: 
how can specialist production of knowledge nonetheless bypass partial perspective to 
a degree that guarantees truth? The SR answer is suggested in Young’s reference to 
networks, institutions and practice codes that build up over [historic] time—and also 
across social spaces. SRs here invest strongly in Durkheim’s distinction between 
‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ social grounds of knowledge. Says Young (2008a:146-147): 
 
Durkheim … wanted to emphasize the ‘sociality’ of knowledge, but in 
contrast to social constructivism, stressed the differences not the 
similarities between different types of knowledge, and explored the 
different types of social organization associated with them…. His 
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starting point was a distinction between profane and sacred orders of 
meaning that he found in every society that he studied. The profane 
refers to people’s response to their everyday world—it is practical, 
immediate and particular…. [T]he sacred was a collective product of a 
society, and not related directly to any real world problem … [and so] 
both social and removed from the everyday world.  
 
Although inhering in a religious locus in earlier historic periods, ‘the sacred for 
Durkheim’, notes Young (ibid:147), ‘became the paradigm for all other kinds of 
conceptual knowledge including science, philosophy and mathematics’ (ibid:147). 
Wherever ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ might divergently locate in given historic eras, 
Young and Muller (2010:121) suggest 
 
it was in the differentiation between the ‘sacred’ as an internally 
consistent world of concepts and the ‘profane’ as a vague and 
contradictory continuum of procedures and practices that Durkheim 
found the social basis of science and the origins of speculative thought. 
 
That is, the ‘sacred’ plane of meaning constitutes a far deeper, broader and more 
cohesively ordered continuum of concepts and practices than the ‘profane’. Compared 
to the vague and contradictory resonances that emerge across diverse sites of profane 
(everyday) knowledge, there is, say Maton and Moore (2010), a special ‘capacity for 
intellectual fields to build powerful and cumulative knowledge over time’ (ibid:6), 
which consists in a ‘coalition of minds extending across time and space’ (ibid:12). In 
explicating this ‘coalition of minds’, Maton and Moore (ibid:10) quote a rousing 
passage from Durkheim (1967:15): 
 
Collective representations are the product of an immense cooperation 
that extends not only through space but also through time; to make 
them, a multitude of different minds have associated, intermixed, and 
combined their ideas and feelings; long generations have accumulated 
their experience and knowledge. 
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The logic seems to be that diverse and plural streamlets of actually situated 
knowledge ‘communities’ flow into, and ultimately partake of, a great river of 
singular communion across a vast reach of social space and historic time. We read 
this to suggest that we need not worry over partialities and contestations inhering in 
situated instances of disciplinary knowledge work. Rather, any limits on objectivity of 
given instances are transcended in the social-historical accumulation across which 
multitudinous sites of work on knowledge mix and combine. This long accumulation 
flows towards convergence that—in the impartiality of its vastness—dissolves 
progressively accumulated disciplinary knowledge of any partialities among members 
situated in particular time/space locations of knowledge work. No matter, then, if 
concrete time/space instances of scientific community comprise people whose social-
structural positions and cultural-historical perspectives do not equally represent 
groups populating the wider social space. Via Durkheim, SR thus conjures a locus of 
knowledge production at once social yet otherworldly (‘sacred’) in its extending 
continuum that transcends particular time/space settings. 
 
With due respect to Durkheim, this trope of ‘long generations’ of ‘immense 
cooperation’ strikes us as a grand hyperbole. Moreover, invoked by SRs to warrant a 
truth-guaranteeing impartiality of specialist knowledge communities, we see it as a 
desired imaginary: an article of faith, not fact—and a faith on which a good deal of 
argumentative effort to distinguish social realism from social constructivism hinges. 
 
Defending ‘sacred’ impartiality against ‘profane’ partial objectivity 
Maton and Moore (ibid:10-11) invoke Durkheim in a call to arms against critical 
analysts who give focus to how partial perspectives, associated with elite social-
structural positions (or standpoints), predominate in curriculum: 
 
Durkheim’s description encapsulates … the nature of the social realist 
enterprise: a key aspect of the process of knowledge production and 
development is its sociality … in a shared intellectual field. Because 
constructivist and post-structuralist approaches see only power at play, 
they cannot fully understand the social nature of knowledge…. By 
overfocusing on the social (in terms of power relations) and neglecting 
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knowledge they paradoxically neglect a crucial dimension of the social 
in knowledge and education. 
 
It is here claimed that, unlike social realists, social constructivists do not take 
knowledge seriously qua knowledge (‘powerful knowledge’), seeing only relations of 
power inequality at play (‘knowledge that has power’). We will argue that this is a 
reductive caricature, which refuses to see how ‘constructivist’ projects can take 
seriously both the power of knowledge and the power relations infused in knowledge. 
To begin, we recall that SRs do allow that social-structural power relations often 
infuse educational knowledge selection; says Moore (2013:339): ‘it might in fact be 
the case that official educational knowledge does reflect the standpoint and interests 
of dominant social groups’ (in this and further quotes from Moore 2013, italics are in 
the original). Nor do SRs disagree with the basic ‘constructivist’ premise that 
knowledge of realities (natural or social) is always socially constructed, never 
transparently revealed. Says Moore (ibid:344), ‘all knowledge is humanly produced 
and reflects the condition under which it is produced’, which means ‘that knowledge 
is always fallible … [and so] constantly open to revision’. This modifies how we 
might take Young’s assertion (cited earlier) that the deep social networks of 
intellectual fields ‘guarantee truth claims’. What SRs claim as guaranteed is not 
absolute or final truth, but superior progressive advancement on truth due to 
capacities special to conditions and procedures of intellectual knowledge fields. The 
sociality of these fields, says Moore (ibid:345), assures ‘ judgemental rationality … 
more powerful than others’ in that ‘the knowledge so produced is more reliable by 
virtue of how it is produced’. 
 
Social realists mark their distinction from constructivists, then, in upholding the 
special(ist) status—Durkheim’s ‘sacredness’—of intellectual fields as loci of 
judgemental rationality that significantly transcends partialities and so guarantees 
powers of knowledge qua knowledge. In contrast, constructivists fail to respect a 
special locus of judgement—they see intellectual communities, too, as inevitably 
partial in their knowledge productions, and so prone to ‘profane’ plays of unequal 
power relation in those productions. Constructivists thus cannot escape what SR’s see 
as the greatest sin of rejecting a ‘sacred’ court of appeal to judgement: relativism. 
Says Young (2008a:25; our italics): 
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By arguing that all knowledge derives from partial and potentially self-
interested standpoints, relativism can be seen as a superficially 
powerful basis for challenging what are assumed to be the repressive 
and dominant knowledge forms of the existing curriculum…. [T]hey 
[thus] deny to oppressed communities the possibility of [powerful] 
knowledge that goes beyond their experience and might play a part in 
enabling them to overcome their oppression. 
 
SR casting of a standpoint focus as inevitably relativist has been challenged by 
scholars (e.g. Michelson 2004; Edwards 2014) aligned with the constructivist 
philosophy of science known as standpoint theory, or standpoint epistemology. 
Standpoint theory emerged among feminists in circumstances where claims to speak 
in the name of ‘women’ were contested as both partial to ‘white Anglo professional 
class’ women’s experiences, and over-emphasising gender relative to other significant 
axes of power relation. From these discussions emerged theory that ways of 
seeing/knowing ‘realities’ are always partial in being positional: we see from 
somewhere (standpoints), not everywhere (Haraway 1988). As well, our perspectives 
are constructed within intersections of multiple positions in power relations, which 
shift in salience depending on social context and life history. However, standpoint 
theorists see partialities of epistemic perspective as grounded in ontological gravities 
of historically materialised social structures, which are neither infinite nor equally 
weighty. Hence, partialities are not a matter of ‘anything goes’; standpoint theorists 
thus refute notions that their approach is ‘relativist’. Rather, situated perspectives 
represent partial objectivities of insight into social-ontological realities. It is then 
possible to pursue a robust social science that triangulates partial perspectives via 
methodologies of ‘power-sensitive conversation’, yielding ‘stronger objectivity’ than 
the ‘God trick’ (Haraway 1988) of supposed objectification from a dis-interested 
universal perspective. As Harding puts it (1992:582-583; italics in original): 
 
These accounts are not fundamentally about marginal [partial] lives; 
instead they start off research from them; they are about the rest of the 
local and international social order. The point … is not to generate 
ethnosciences, but sciences—systematic causal accounts of how the 
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natural and social orders are organized…. [S]tandpoint theory is 
persistently misread as a kind of “perspectivism” that generates 
relativistic interpretations of nature and social relations…. [Rather,] 
standpoint theory demands acknowledgement of the sociological 
relativism that is the fate of all human enterprises including knowledge 
claims, but rejects epistemological relativism.  
 
Harding here claims a social science that is about knowledge qua knowledge, not 
simply a reduction of knowledge to power relations. This approach takes structural 
power relations seriously—indeed, as an object of sociological objectification—but 
also takes seriously that explanatory power (‘powerful knowledge’) can be gained by 
the hard work of specialist knowledge communities to map systematic causalities 
across the partial objectivities that they research. We suggest that, up to a point, this 
agrees with SR claims for specialist powers of intellectual networks to achieve strong 
objectivity. Likewise, Harding’s rejection of ‘epistemological relativism’—rejecting 
the view ‘that each of [the] (often conflicting) [cultural] standards that different 
groups use is equally valid, equally good’ (ibid:576)—accords with SR arguments. 
 
However, the pivotal contention, as we read it, is in Harding’s insistence on 
‘sociological relativism’: ‘that different people or cultures have different standards for 
determining what counts as knowledge’; and this ‘is the fate of all human enterprises 
including [scientific] knowledge claims’ (ibid:583). SRs do not accept this degree of 
attribution of partialities within specialist knowledge fields—and it is an important 
matter of degree. Thus when Michelson argues that Muller (2000) misrepresents 
constructivism as relativist—rather, ‘constructivists argue that what is usually taken 
for objectivity in Western knowledge practices is not objective or rigorous enough … 
[in] fail[ing] to take researchers’ own social locatedness into account’ (Michelson 
2004:11; italics in original)—Young (2005:10) pounces: 
 
Donna Haraway may, as quoted by Michelson … combine in one 
sentence the “radical historical contingency of all knowledge claims” 
with a “non-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ 
world”; however, such a combination would be impossible if she was a 
curriculum developer or a teacher. 
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We suggest that a curriculum developer or teacher could, like standpoint theorists, 
combine these two tenets, and Young’s retort about impossibility is ad hominem. 
However, we read his main impulse to be rejection of the first tenet on grounds that 
we cannot forfend against relativism unless we purchase the impartiality of a locus of 
judgemental rationality that is sacredly separated from profane power-relational 
dynamics. Hence, SRs see no call to consider the argument that triangulation across 
partially objectifying accounts could yield a ‘stronger objectivity’. (We have seen no 
SR text that suspends the shout of ‘constructivist-equals-relativist’ long enough to 
consider the actual argument.) 
 
Again, we stress that SR argumentation hinges on faith in the social-ontological 
‘reality’ of an impartial locus achieved by ‘immense cooperation’ across ‘long 
generations’. If we find we cannot purchase this faith, then standpoint theorists’ more 
modest claim for ‘stronger objectivity’—achievable when diverse scholarly 
communities triangulate partially objectified knowledges—is, we suggest, a better 
purchase. The evidence of our sense and judgement, as knowledge workers across 
educational fields of sociology, curriculum and policy, is that these fields do not 
embody the impartiality and cumulative coherence wished for by SRs, either 
presently or via past-present-future accumulation (as Kuhn 1962, perhaps overdoing 
historical discontinuity, nonetheless cogently argued even for ‘hard science’ fields). 
We thus advocate a more modest claim for ‘judgemental rationality’ achievable in our 
fields by practice of what Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) call ‘reflexive sociology’—
akin to Haraway’s (1988) ‘power sensitive conversation’—that takes self-critical 
account of what positional standpoints are centred, marginalised and absent within 
field networks, and how these power relations affect knowledge work in our fields.  
 
Moreover, conceptual investment in a ‘context-independent’ locus of social-yet-
impartial knowledge—removed from profane contexts of power struggle—seems, 
ironically, to incite a wish for this ‘sacred’ social realm to be ethics-free as well as 
epistemologically non-arbitrary.  
 
Stressing socio-cognitive over socio-ethical purposes for education 
 12 
Young and Muller (2010:122-123), in discussing how SR builds upon Durkheim, note 
a problem that they wish to attenuate: 
 
[T]here remains the issue that … [f]or Durkheim, the social is the 
moral: it is about values. Insofar as knowledge (and the curriculum) are 
social, they too for Durkheim are primarily moral issues. This makes it 
difficult to use his framework to explore questions of knowledge 
content and structure that are avoided by … social constructivism. Is 
Durkheim right in equating the social with the moral, even when it 
comes to the question of knowledge? Or can we envision a non-moral 
concept of the social? We think the answer to the latter question must 
be yes … [because] issues of the structure and content of knowledge 
must lie at the heart of the sociology of the curriculum. 
 
‘The social’ where Young and Muller look for a non-moral address to knowledge 
questions is of course not the profane but the sacred locus. As part and parcel of their 
strong binary separation of ‘sacred’ from ‘profane’, they here suggest a stark 
either/or: questions of knowledge selection for curriculum must find authorisation in a 
social-epistemological but not social-ethical basis. Against this view, we will argue 
that a both/and—ethical-and-epistemological—valuation of reasons for curriculum 
knowledge selection is both viable and desirable, and indeed their mutual exclusion is 
impossible. We will argue further that conjuring such a mutual exclusion severely 
curtails dialogue and debate about purposes for curriculum. However, we need first to 
examine the reasoning and assumptions behind such impulse to separate ethics from 
knowledge questions. 
 
For the needed re-thinking of Durkheim, Young and Muller hail the foremost latter-
day ‘Durkheimian’ in education, Basil Bernstein, who—in one of his last writings 
before his death, ‘Vertical and Horizontal Discourse: an essay’ (1999)—analysed 
structures of both everyday (profane) and scientific (sacred) knowledge. Say Young 
and Muller (2010:124): 
 
As is by now well known, [Bernstein] distinguished between two 
forms of discourse, horizontal and vertical, and within vertical 
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discourse, between two kinds of knowledge structure: hierarchical and 
horizontal. 
 
Regarding discourse forms, Bernstein made a broad distinction between ‘vertical’ 
modes of knowledge that characterise intellectual disciplines, compared to 
‘horizontal’ modes that characterise social spaces of everyday life. In terms of 
structures, Bernstein more finely distinguished between modes of knowledge 
organisation across diverse disciplinary fields. Although the discourses of all those 
fields are ‘vertical’ relative to everyday life discourses, at the structural level of 
analysis, discourses of humanities and social science fields are less ‘vertical’, or 
‘hierarchical’, than the ‘harder science’ fields. Say Young and Muller (ibid): 
 
In hierarchical knowledge structures it develops through the integration 
of propositions, towards ever more general [i.e. abstract; universally 
extensive] sets of propositions…. In contrast, horizontal knowledge 
structures are not unitary but plural; they consist of a series of parallel 
and incommensurable languages (or sets of concepts). Verticality in 
horizontal knowledge structures [thus] occurs not through integration 
but through the introduction of … apparently new problematic[s] … 
The level of integration, and the possibility for knowledge progress in 
the sense of greater generality and hence wider explanatory reach, is 
thus strictly limited. 
 
That is, disciplinary fields such as sociology are ‘vertical’ in relative contrast to 
everyday life knowledge. However, compared, say, to physics—Bernstein’s par 
excellence example of a hierarchically structured field—sociology embodies ‘weak 
grammar’; and Young and Muller, as educational sociologists, hope to find ways to 
‘stiffen its vertical spine’ rather than remain ‘uncomfortably close to the relativism of 
pragmatism and constructivism’ (ibid:128). 
 
We appreciate Bernstein’s historical-analytic distinctions between how the knowledge 
structures of different disciplines have taken form. We agree that knowledge 
development in our field—sociology of education—is ‘horizontal’ as defined above, 
compared to physics. Yet we do not share SR discomfort with this more parallel than 
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vertical accumulation of conceptual tools and problematics. On similar grounds to 
above arguments for standpoint theory, we do not see a ‘relativist’ tragedy, since both 
older and newer conceptual lenses do get tested for explanatory power in relation to 
socially emergent problematics that are materially substantive, not anything-goes. 
Moreover, these lenses can triangulate (they are not all incommensurable with each 
other) around problematics, shedding mutual light on each other’s ‘blind spots’ 
(Wagner 1993) to yield ‘stronger objectivity’ which, we argue, does generate widened 
explanatory reach. 
 
We also agree that life-world knowledge is ‘horizontal’ compared to disciplinary 
bodies of knowledge. However we challenge SR characterisations of this horizontality 
that strike us as a deficit view that misses rich potentials to use life-world knowledge 
for curriculum learning purposes. Here (briefly) is Bernstein’s definition (1999:159): 
 
We are all aware and use a form of knowledge, usually typified as 
everyday or ‘common-sense’ knowledge…. This form has a group of 
well-known features: it is likely to be oral, local, context dependent 
and specific, tacit, multi-layered and contradictory across but not 
within contexts…. [T]he crucial feature is that is it segmentally 
organised.  
 
If SRs worry about losing explanatory reach to ‘relativism’ via ‘weak grammars’ of 
some disciplinary knowledge fields, which still have relative verticality and they still 
see fit to include in curriculum, they are far more worried about the degrees to which 
everyday knowledge embodies segmentation (not integration), locality (not 
generality), context dependence (not context-independence), and contradiction (not 
coherence and commensurability) across contexts. Young (2008a:89) asserts: 
 
Bernstein’s distinction between vertical and horizontal knowledge 
structures … assumes that … the codes and practices associated with 
subjects and disciplines … are designed to set the curriculum apart 
from the everyday knowledge that students bring to school … [and] it 
is this separation of the curriculum from everyday life that gives the 
knowledge acquired through it an explanatory power and capacity for 
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generalization that is not a feature of everyday knowledge tied to 
practical concerns…. Certain principles for guiding curriculum policy 
necessarily follow …[including that] curriculum cannot be based on 
everyday practical experience. Such a curriculum would only recycle 
that experience.  
 
To avoid basing curriculum on everyday practical experience does not mean there is 
no pedagogic use for lifeworld-based knowledge in classrooms. Bernstein argues that, 
depending on which learners and subjects, teaching can usefully entail stronger or 
weaker boundary separation (what Bernstein calls ‘classification’) between 
disciplinary and everyday knowledge. However, SRs are insistent that ‘The purpose 
of schooling … is to specialise learners’ voice by induct[ing] learners into the 
“uncommonsense” knowledge of formal education—or the school code’ (Hoadley 
2006:16). This means that life-world knowledge can at best be used as stepping stones 
to scaffold learning towards induction into vertical (specialised) knowledge codes, 
leaving life-based horizontal codes behind. 
 
From a SR perspective, the contaminating deficits that everyday experiential 
knowledge imparts to curriculum go beyond the problem that everyday knowledge is 
confined to local sensibility, thus segmented across locales. SRs see co-related 
problems that get closer to why they seek a non-moral social basis for curriculum 
knowledge selection. To grasp their view of ethical grounds for curriculum as 
contaminating, we explore Young’s (2008a) efforts to work out whether/how 
Vygotsky offers viable ways to ameliorate some problems with, and so strengthen, the 
Durkheimian framework that SR privileges. 
 
Young suggests that Durkheim saw the ‘sacred’ locus of collective social 
representations in too holistic a way, making it difficult to conceptualise how given 
social knowledge fields change historically. As Young sees it, an interactive dynamic 
between different parts within a social ‘whole’ is needed to conceptualise historical 
movement in knowledge development at specialist levels. Young is therefore 
intrigued that Vygotsky, while paralleling Durkheim in distinguishing between 
‘scientific’ and ‘everyday’ knowledge, at the same time enables a historical dynamic 
by conceptualising an ‘interrelatedness of the two types of concept’, which ‘offers 
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some advantages over a Durkheimian analysis’ (ibid:58). Young does however claim 
Vygotsky as substantively aligned with SR on the necessity of privileging ‘scientific’ 
over ‘everyday’ concepts (ibid:52): 
 
Vygotsky’s primary emphasis is, in my view, on the limitations of 
everyday concepts …[in that they] lack any capacity for abstraction 
and generalization and fail to provide the learner with the resources to 
act in what he referred to as a voluntary (or free) manner. 
 
We later argue that this is a highly dubious reading of Vygotsky. At this juncture, we 
note that, elsewhere in his text, Young betrays significant ambivalence about his 
above suggestion that Vygotsky sees limited usefulness for everyday knowledge, 
compared to scientific knowledge, for curriculum purposes. Young’s concerns focus 
on the Marxian dialectical way that Vygotsky interrelates everyday and scientific 
knowledge (ibid:61): 
 
[T]o the extent to which Vygotsky was a Marxist, epistemological 
questions about knowledge as a separate category distinct from 
practice did not exist; they were always resolved in practice, in the 
course of history. It follows that Vygotsky’s distinction between 
scientific and common-sense concepts was a contingent one to be 
overcome in practice and through learning. For Durkheim the 
separation between theoretical knowledge and common sense was not 
contingent—it was real; the development of knowledge … involved 
the progressive replacement of one kind of theoretical knowledge 
(religion) by another (science). Hence the necessary social basis of 
knowledge. 
 
In this contrast, Young again champions Durkheimian separation of ‘profane’ and 
‘sacred’ social grounds for knowledge, with school curriculum based on the latter as 
where powerful knowledge truly advances. Elsewhere (ibid:74) he quotes 
‘Durkheim’s view that “in all the history of human thought there exists no example of 
two categories (the sacred and the profane) so profoundly differentiated or so 
radically opposed” (Durkheim 1995:53)’. In further passages, he urges a need to 
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sustain this ‘insularity’ against relativist dangers of ‘hybridity’. But we ask: Is 
interrelation, rather than stark binary separation, so terrible for learning purposes? 
Cannot school learning advance through rich curricular interaction between everyday 
and scientific knowledge? Young (2008a:51-52) indeed quotes statements from 
Vygotsky to this effect; for example (Vygotsky 1962:108): ‘[S]pontaneous concepts 
[emerging in children’s engagements with everyday life-worlds] are already “rich in 
experience” but, because they are not part of a system, they provide no explanations 
and can lead to confusions’. This might be read to warrant Young’s claim that 
Vygotsky stresses limitations for curriculum from everyday concepts. However, 
Young also quotes Vygotsky (1962:98): ‘The rudiments of systematization first enter 
the child’s mind by way of his [sic] contact with scientific concepts and are then 
transferred to everyday concepts, changing their psychological structure’. 
 
Is there no educational merit to Vygotsky’s idea that scientific knowledge, interacting 
with everyday knowledge in school curriculum, offers power to systematise and 
clarify learners’ spontaneous conceptions, while learning also gains substance and 
vitality from those spontaneous conceptions emergent in practical engagement with 
life-worlds? Although Young does not directly address this question, he continually 
invokes Durkheim’s affirmations of the binary insularity of scientific from life-world 
knowledge, as against dialectical interrelation. This strongly suggests he thinks 
‘spontaneous concepts’ would profanely contaminate ‘real science’ learning that 
curriculum must foreground. Young’s critiques of Vygotskyan ‘dialectics’ offer 
further clues to how he sees everyday life knowledge as contaminating, such that 
good curriculum, and science, must keep to a separated ‘sacred’. We here quote a few 
such passages from Young (2008a; our italics): 
 
 By locating knowledge in the history of human beings’ actions on 
the external world, a dialectical approach treats knowledge as a 
product of human labour … in the Marxist sense … [of] purposive 
activity ….Within such an analysis, knowledge and truth, as distinct 
categories referring to cause and explanations that are not tied to 
political purposes, disappear (39).  
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 Vygotsky’s emphasis on social activity appears to preclude him 
from treating knowledge as something that can be conceptualized as 
separate from its uses. The importance of being able to separate 
knowledge from its uses is of course Durkheim’s key point in his 
critique of pragmatism (66). 
 Durkheim was seeking an answer to why we find logic so 
compelling; in other words, where, he asked, did its undoubted 
power over our thinking come from? For Durkheim this power 
could never arise out of its usefulness in terms of satisfying specific 
needs. Consequences, he argued, are inevitably unreliable criteria 
for truth. The power of logic has to refer to factors that are a priori 
and external to any specific human activity (70). 
 
In the above passages, we italicise words we see to have significant ethical tonalities. 
Along with the epistemological contaminants of horizontality—contingency, 
contradiction, segmentation—ethically inflected problems of practical life 
mattering—use, purpose, need—are seen to taint the a priori power of knowledge in a 
‘sacred’ realm of non-moralised logos. (In effect, this is logo-centric insistence on a 
fact-value distinction—a point to which we return later 1 ). It would seem that 
separation of knowledge questions from ethics questions is necessary to guarantee 
that compellingly powerful logic, from a high-minded plane beyond actual human 
activity and its uses and purposes, can exist and so be brought to bear in explanatory 
application to profane life-worldly matters. The sacred plane must primarily be about 
advancing knowledge and its power to establish objectivity and truth, not morality. 
And so must curriculum. After flirting with Vygotskian possibilities, then, Young 
does not seem to know what to do with Vygotsky. How Vygotsky might help 
historicise a primarily Durkheimian project is not explained. In the last instance, 
Vygotsky’s regard for the educational value of life-world knowledge—as a key 
curriculum element in dialectical interrelation with science-world knowledge—
threatens to inject weak epistemological grammars and profane ethical valuations into 
the latter; and this will not do. 
                                                        
1
 We thank Fazal Rizvi for helpful conversation about the fact-value distinction in 
relation to SR. 
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In what follows we argue, by contrast, for a dialectical approach to curriculum, rather 
than a binary orientation that strives to separate school-privileged disciplinary 
knowledge from life-world knowledge. We maintain that: (a) well-selected life-world 
knowledge offers depth and vitality to schooled thinking and learning; and (b) both 
epistemological and ethical purposes are crucially relevant—and not actually 
separable—for curriculum knowledge selection. 
 
Curriculum dialectics: Bringing life-world epistemology (and social 
ontology) back in  
If Young finds that ‘Vygotsky’s primary emphasis is … on the limitations of 
everyday concepts’ (cited above), Luis Moll, in L.S. Vygotsky and education (2014), 
offers a very different reading. Moll certainly appreciates how Vygotsky valued 
scientific knowledge’s systematising power for school learning. However, Moll 
underscores the primary value Vygotsky put on life-based knowledge. Moll observes 
(2014:120) that, in relation to curriculum, Vygotsky ‘place[d] a high premium … on 
respecting and understanding the cultural diversity of life’. Moll (ibid:120-121) goes 
on to quote Vygotsky (1997:345): 
 
[T]here [should] exist within the very nature of the educational 
process, within its psychological essence … as close an interaction, 
with life itself as might be wished for. Ultimately only life educates, 
and the deeper that life … burrows into the school, the more dynamic 
and the more robust will be the educational process. That the school 
has been locked away and walled in as if by a tall fence from life itself 
has been its greatest failing. Education is just as meaningless outside 
the … [life] world as is a fire without oxygen, or as breathing in a 
vacuum. The teacher’s educational work, therefore, must be inevitably 
connected with his [or her] creative social and life work (original 
italics). 
 
Vygotksy’s stress on bringing life into curriculum, through more permeable school 
walls, indicates a philosophical vitalism: education that does not engage life-world 
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processes of making sense is baseless like fire, or human bodies, without oxygen to 
breathe. Not only students, but also teachers, need life-based vitality in the knowledge 
(curriculum) they transact via learning interactions (pedagogy). However, what does 
Vygotsky mean in saying that ‘ultimately only life educates’? As we will show, he 
does not mean scientific knowledge is either unimportant for learning, or indistinct in 
properties from life-world knowledge. We read him to mean that all worthwhile 
knowledge formations, including disciplinary bodies of knowledge, sustain vitality in 
engaging problematics deriving from ‘profane’ life—and not just ‘initially’ but 
continuingly and inextricably. 
 
We underscore that Vygotsky did not see knowledge drawn from life-worlds as 
sufficient, by itself, for school learning. As Young quoted Vygotsky (cited above), 
‘spontaneous concepts’ emerging in children’s engagements with life-worlds, while 
‘rich in experience’, lack needed explanatory powers of systematisation; and 
‘systematization first enter[s] the child’s mind by way of his [sic] contact with 
scientific concepts’ through schooling, which ‘are then transferred to everyday 
concepts, changing their psychological structure’. Likewise, Moll (2014:34-35) notes 
that Vygotsky, in conceiving how learners extend knowledge capacities in ‘the zone 
of proximal development’, envisioned  
 
[inter]relationship between … what he called “spontaneous” and 
“scientific” concepts ….The key difference is that scientific, or 
schooled, concepts … as compared with everyday or spontaneous 
concepts … are acquired through, a system of formal instruction. The 
observation that scientific concepts tend to be acquired in school and 
everyday concepts … out of school is not as important as the 
characteristic of systematicity: the way scientific concepts form part of 
an organised system of knowledge and thus can more easily be 
reflected upon and deliberately manipulated. 
 
While Vygotsky thus appreciated the need for systematising powers of specialist 
knowledge in school learning, spontaneous conceptions emergent in everyday life are 
hardly a secondary element in his curriculum dialectic. It is not only, notes Moll 
(ibid:35), that ‘the relationship between everyday and scientific concepts is 
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reciprocal’, i.e. ‘[t]hey mediate each other’, but that scientific concepts need vital 
connection to everyday concepts in order to sustain meaningful significance. Says 
Moll (ibid:35): 
 
Everyday concepts provide the “conceptual fabric” for the 
development of schooled concepts, and the everyday concepts are also 
transformed through their connection with the more systematic 
concepts. Scientific concepts grow into the everyday, into the domain 
of personal experience, thus acquiring meaning and significance. 
However, scientific concepts bring with them conscious awareness and 
control, which Vygotsky believed to be essential characteristics of 
schooling. 
 
In Vygotsky’s rationale for a curriculum dialectic, as rendered by Moll, specialised 
systems of thought are crucial for learning, and have the effect of transforming 
everyday concepts: ‘verticalising’ their structure, we might say. However, scientific 
concepts reciprocally gain living significance from the dialectical interrelation. As 
compared to Durkheimian binary thinking, this dialectical thinking sees the ‘profane’ 
plane of life-world knowledge as the very epistemological fabric necessary for 
scientific concepts to gain and sustain meaning. Life-world emergences of knowledge 
contents, forms and ways of knowing (in the verb sense of active processes of thought-
engaging-worlds) are, in this view, not contaminants but assets—what Moll and 
associates call funds of knowledge (Moll, Amanti, Neff & Gonalez 1992; Gonzalez, 
Moll & Amanti 2005; Moll 2014)—for school learning of the concept systems of 
organised disciplines. Thus, Moll suggests (2014:36; original italics) that ‘formations 
of … subjectivities, intimately related to the living of everyday life’, whereby people 
‘internalise the social world they experience’, constitute ‘the foundation, one could 
say, for further learning, including the specialized learning typical of school’.  
 
We suggest that life-based knowledge as ongoing foundation for further learning 
applies not only to learning processes in schools, but also to knowledge work in 
specialist communities. In this view, particularly in ‘human’ and ‘social’ science 
disciplines, research problematics that matter for future knowledge work 
continuously emerge from life more primarily than science. Science-worlds, then, 
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ought not aspire to leave life-worlds behind in determining where new knowledge 
might matter. Rather, they need continuing contact with the life-breath of newly 
emergent problems and associated sense-makings from life-worlds, or they become 
static: they lose the livingness of history as change (which Young flagged as a 
challenge for Durkheim’s ‘sacred’). This is a key argument in many ‘practice’ and 
‘pragmatist’ philosophies of science (Stengers 1997; Carr & Kemmis 1986; Biesta 
2014). As Moll (2014:117, 120) puts it: 
 
Such processual and emergentist perspectives [on knowledge] are 
central to a Vygotskian formulation … [which] think[s] about culture 
as dynamic and changing, never fixed or static, and full of agency and 
versatility, especially in response to the many different circumstances 
of material life. 
 
We understand, as SR authors oft remind us, that Durkheim criticised ‘pragmatist’ 
philosophical thought (including Dewey). We will not go into the SR critique of 
pragmatism; suffice to say it is like SR critique of standpoint theory. Our argument, 
from a Vygotskian counter-perspective, is that SRs push too hard and far towards 
Durkheimian binary separation and school privileging of ‘sacred’ knowledge. We also 
suggest there is a fine line between (a) high regard for contributions from ‘great 
minds’ such as Durkheim, and (b) fetishistic regard that, even in identifying problems 
‘the tradition’ needs to work upon, wields ‘the tradition’ to knock back other trains of 
thought which challenge theirs. There is need for respectful debate, open to 
considering pros and cons, and gains and losses, across contending ways of thinking 
about curriculum knowledge selection. Moreover, if empirical ‘evidence’ can be 
mobilised for a Durkheimian binary case about how science works, so can ‘evidence’ 
be mounted for a Vygotskian dialectical case. Ultimately, there are unprovable first 
principles underpinning distinctions in approach, and the key test is explanatory 
power of conceptual tools in application to empirical fields (Bhaskar 1989:49-50). 
(While we lack textual space to discuss those who join aspects of Bernstein and 
Vygotsky in pursuing greater explanatory power, in ways we consider less hampered 
by SR’s insistent binarism, we note Daniels (2012) in this regard.) 
 
 23 
In our section staging SR debate with standpoint theory, we argued that knocking 
back standpoint theory as ‘relativist’, by way of asserting specialist knowledge 
communities as guarantors of impartiality, hinges too greatly on the hyperbolic trope 
of a ‘coalition’ of scientific minds across space/time. In this section we have argued 
that the associated strong binary separation of ‘sacred’ from ‘profane’ knowledge 
costs us the value of educative work both with life-world and science-world 
knowledge. Via Vygotsky by way of Moll, we have pursued an epistemological 
‘bringing back in’ of life-world funds of knowledge for curriculum use, and a life-
world social ontology underpinning this reclamation. Previously we also flagged 
another worrisome loss from a too-muscular SR binary: the separation of ethical 
purposes from epistemological purposes—privileging the latter—for schooled work 
with knowledge. In the next section we pursue arguments for ‘bringing ethical 
purposes back in’ to curriculum. 
 
Bringing ethical valuations back in 
It is important to appreciate that, in the ‘funds of knowledge’ (henceforth FoK) 
approach for bringing life-world knowledge into curriculum, the everyday knowledge 
brought in is hardly of the banal sort that the South African OBE curriculum featured: 
‘driving a car, tying your shoelaces, cooking rice’ (Hoadley & Jansen 2009:181). 
Moll et al. (1992) define FoK as ‘historically accumulated and culturally developed 
bodies of knowledge and skills’ (ibid:133) meaningfully put to use as ‘household and 
other community resources’ (ibid:132). FoK are thus richly meaningful to the 
practices and identities of given social-cultural groups represented in classrooms 
(Esteban-Guitart & Moll 2014). A FoK approach does not indiscriminately take all 
life-world knowledge to constitute assets (‘funds’) for school learning. Of course 
populist and otherwise simplistic ‘common-sense’, and ‘bad sense’, circulate in life-
worlds along with ‘good sense’. Moll (2014:122) outlines how a FoK approach 
selects FoK by a process of research in students’ home and community locales, 
followed by study groups in which academic- and teacher-researchers discuss ‘theory, 
data collection, and findings’ to identify FoK with a richness worth building into 
curriculum units. In this process, a key selective principle is the lived use-value of 
knowledge. Say Moll et al. (1992:133; our italics): 
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Our approach … stud[ies] how household members use their funds of 
knowledge in dealing with changing, and often difficult, social and 
economic circumstances … [in] multiple spheres of activity within 
which the child is enmeshed. 
 
This approach gives respect to knowledge-abilities in which people develop useful 
meaning and practice around vital needs emergent in their life-worlds—entailing 
problematics, we argue, running more broad and deep than so-called ‘horizontally 
segmented’ locales (we return to this point shortly). In highlighting use, we hark back 
to Young’s assertion (2008:66) that ‘[t]he importance of being able to separate 
knowledge from its uses is of course Durkheim’s key point in his critique of 
pragmatism’. In contrast, FoK and other Vygotskian approaches are indeed Marxist in 
valuing knowledge in relation to use. Such approaches, we argue, entail ethical 
reclamation of use-values from school tendencies to stage market-exchange contests 
that selectively privilege the cultural capital associated with relatively powerful 
social-structural positions. Says Zipin (2009:319; our italics): 
 
Against a logic of capital accumulation, the ‘funds of knowledge’ 
metaphor mobilises a counter-logic of meaningful cultural use …. 
While FoK literature registers a need, in societies structured by capital, 
to redistribute ‘winning’ cultural modalities to learners from less 
powerful families, it nonetheless gives pride of place to lifeworld-
based use values. This incites qualitative and ethical shifts in our sense 
of what has learning ‘value’: not a narrow exchange-value power of 
selectively elite cultural modes, reproducing society structured by 
capital accumulation; but an expanded use-value agency of life in 
varied social positions, creating more egalitarian, democratic and 
intellectually rich curriculum that puts diverse lifeworld learning assets 
to use.  
 
Ethical reclamation is here linked to curriculum that, while redistributing ‘cultural 
capital’ as an unavoidable matter of practical justice, ethically refuses domination by 
capital’s exchange-value logic. Rather, it gives ethical priority—‘pride of place’—to 
knowledge that has use-value in learners’ lived social-cultural spaces. Pride of place 
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emphasises socially situated, culturally specific knowledge practices and uses. This 
contrasts with SR stress on universal knowledge. Nonetheless, SR also valorises use 
purposes for school knowledge. As discussed earlier, SRs urge educationists not to 
over-obsess about ‘knowledge that has power’, but instead to value the empowering 
uses that ‘powerful knowledge’ offers those who acquire it in school. However, 
Vygotskian approaches see more empowerment offered via curriculum in which 
learners work, dialectically, with use values of both life-world and specialised 
knowledge. By contrast, SRs dismiss the use-value of life-world knowledge because, 
as compared to universal (‘vertical’) knowledge from the ‘sacred’ plane of specialist 
disciplines, it is mired in ‘need’, ‘purpose’, and other political-ethical limits of 
‘horizontality’: of being ‘local, context dependent and specific, tacit, multi-layered 
and contradictory across … contexts’ (Bernstein 1999:159). 
 
Vygotskian approaches, then, reclaim a use-value ethics that SRs see as thankfully 
voided in specialist knowledge processes, and want likewise to avoid in curriculum. 
Against this, we argue—joining both Vygotskians and standpoint theorists—that it is 
precisely the situated partiality of life-world funds of knowledge that enables such 
knowledge to contribute to ‘stronger objectivity’ that triangulates across contexts of 
‘partial objectivity’ and to bring valuable ethical considerations into educative—and 
scientific—settings. Furthermore, we question whether life-world FoK is as limited by 
‘horizontality’ as SRs assert. That is, ‘power-sensitive conversation’ across life-world 
settings, furthered by educative processes, can raise consciousness to how place-based 
FoK carry global dimensions running across locales. Freirean educational work—
paralleling FoK approaches—scaffolds vernacular oral literacies of people in high-
poverty locations towards written literacy capacity. In the process, educators and 
power-marginalised people think together, teach each other, and raise critical 
consciousness to ‘generative themes’ of global connection that run within-and-across 
local social spaces (Freire 1970; Shor 1987). This is another kind of dialectical 
education that, in linking local FoK with globalising problematics, identifies deep and 
extensive—we might say ‘verticalising’—global connections between localities. 
 
While we agree with SRs that redistributing ‘knowledge that has power’—cultural 
capital—ought not dominate ethical pursuit of social justice via curriculum, we also 
argue that the problem of arbitrary selective coding of curriculum with the ‘capital’ of 
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those in power-elite social-structural positions cannot be treated as inconsequential. 
There is indeed a tendency in SR argumentation to suggest that curricular provision of 
wider access to ‘powerful knowledge’ renders this problem moot. Maton and Moore 
thus argue (2010:10): 
 
Social realism attempts to recover knowledge in the service of progress 
and social justice. The impulse underlying social realist work is … 
both the creation of epistemologically more powerful forms of 
knowledge and establishing the means to enable them to be accessible 
to everyone. 
 
Moore extends this argument (2013:350; original italics): 
 
SR is the appropriate framework for socially progressive sociology of 
education because it secures, contra … constructivist relativisms, 
strong justice claims with strong rather than weak knowledge claims. 
The powerful are so not because they can arbitrarily impose their 
knowledge/culture as ‘powerful knowledge/culture’, but because they 
enjoy privileged access to the knowledge/culture that is powerful in its 
own right. 
 
These statements seem to assert that—already, and not in some future in which 
powerful interests no longer hold sway to institute their knowledge as an unjustly 
selective ‘gold standard’ in curriculum—the only social justice problem is access to 
knowledge that is ‘powerful in its own right’. It would seem the most powerfully 
specialist knowledge is one-and-the-same as the ‘cultural capital’ most valued by 
those who are structurally powerful. Hence, we need not worry about arbitrary 
injustice in which ‘knowledge that has power’ is imposed. We need simply 
redistribute powerful knowledge, via curriculum, so that it is everyone’s and not the 
hoarded ‘capital’ of the few. 
 
If only the vastly and deeply instituted logic of capital—as powerful accumulations of 
commodities that are exchange-valued for their manufactured scarcity—could be so 
easily undone. SR denial of formidable processes that sustain selective coding of 
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curriculum to reproduce inequalities supports a thin conception of justice as mere 
redistribution of access to empowering knowledge. In the process, complex ethical 
matters linked to structural power inequalities are avoided. As when extracting 
morality from Durkheim’s ‘sacred’ social plane, SRs thus make curriculum justice a 
matter of epistemology trumping ethics rather than inseparable from ethics. In the 
next section we draw on Nancy Fraser’s thick conception of ‘justice’ to argue that, in 
limiting curriculum ‘justice’ to access to knowledge developed in specialised 
locations, SRs avoid inextricable questions not merely of what knowledge is selected, 
but whose knowledge, and how selected. Robust address to these matters of justice, 
we argue (with Fraser), requires joining knowledge redistribution to ethical concerns 
for recognition of diverse cultural knowledge, and representation of diverse social-
cultural groups in processes of knowledge selection. 
 
Pursuing robust social-educational justice in globalizing conditions 
We here draw on Fraser’s book Scales of justice: Reimagining political space in a 
globalizing world (2009). In this revised collection of previously published essays, 
Fraser explores what she calls ‘the burning question of our day: What is the pertinent 
frame within which to reflect on the requirements of justice in a globalizing world?’ 
(ibid:37; our italics). Framing pertains to ‘interpretations of the circumstances of 
justice’, including ‘understanding of our social and historical circumstances … [and] 
forces that shape people’s lives in a globalizing world’ (ibid:38). The question of 
framing also evokes meta-questions of justice: who is included in determining what 
interpretations count; and how will competing accounts be offered and heard. These 
questions are inseparable from, and trouble the supposed ‘matter-of-factness’ of, the 
question of what counts. Says Fraser (ibid:38-39; our italics): 
  
Those who rely on the normal-social-science approach construe [these 
questions] as settled matters of empirical fact, which do not depend on 
controversial assumptions…. Far from having to worry about the 
relation between fact and value … we need only consult the 
established fruits of normal science…. [Yet] proposed accounts of the 
circumstances of justice are inherently theory-laden and value-laden, 
which is why they are controversial…. The task of adjudicating rival 
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characterizations … must, rather, be handled dialogically, in a 
multifaceted practical discourse that canvasses alternative conceptions, 
unpacks their underlying assumptions, and weighs their relative 
merits—all in full awareness of the internal relations between 
knowledge and normative reflection. 
 
We see SRs to advocate what Fraser calls a ‘normal-social-science approach’, 
according to which ‘fact’—the truth-value of knowledge, presumably guaranteed by 
impartiality of specialist knowledge communities—stands apart from and transcends 
ethical valuations. We argue that this entails a philosophical level of framing 
assumptions, or first principles: it is an assumption, not a fact, that ‘fact’ and ‘value’ 
can be separated. Fraser (who takes up philosophical interventions by Quine 1953) 
articulates a contrary framing assumption—which our arguments in this paper 
share—that ‘knowledge and normative reflection’ are internally related, i.e. 
inextricable. We read Fraser to suggest that ethical valuations (a) are situated and 
partial (standpoint-based); and (b) must be seen as part-and-parcel of all truth claims. 
This means not assuming ‘scientific impartiality’—while still, as per Vygotskians, 
valuing the systematising and other explanatory powers offered by scientific thought. 
However, if competing use/ethics-valuations are inevitable, including in scientific 
discourse, then social science must join and contribute to a wider democratic politics 
of public and inclusive processes for adjudicating who defines what is the substance 
of justice, and how contesting claims are heard and arbitrated. We note that Fraser’s 
philosophical orientations—neo-Habermasian and pragmatic—stress communicative 
democratic processes: the who of justice must be widely inclusive; and the how must 
entail dialogue that is reciprocally informative and clarifying at a level of 
philosophical depth, i.e. unpacking divergent assumptions across competing frames.  
 
When framing assumptions diverge at a level of philosophical first principles—as do 
Fraser’s from those of SR—adjudication is possible not by ‘proof’ but in tests of 
explanatory power to address social-historical conditions that matter to both, and/or to 
others who apply them to conditions. It is important, then, to recognise that Fraser’s 
critique of ‘normal social science’ is based not only on a trans-historical argument—
that it is never possible to separate ‘fact’ from ‘value’—but also on historical grounds: 
‘normal science’ proves inadequate to address globalising conditions. Fraser argues 
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that ‘normal social science’ emerged and gained sway within a Westphalian framing 
of political space in which nation-states were the prime units of governance and of 
justice politics. In ‘this “Westphalian” framing of justice’, says Fraser (ibid:2-3; 
original italics), ‘major political currents converged on a distributive conception’, 
primarily in economic terms, as the what of justice, with ‘the unspoken assumption 
that obligations of distribution applied only among fellow citizens’, as the who of 
justice. The how of justice was the province of state-endorsed ‘scientific experts’, 
relied upon for ‘impartiality … [that] can guarantee a fair assessment of competing 
claims’ (ibid:1; original italics). 
 
Fraser’s historical-contextual diagnosis of Westphalian-framed ‘normal science’ 
implicates SR claims that we have critiqued, viz: (1) the impartiality of science; (2) 
the possibility and virtue of separating epistemic truth from ethical valuation; and (3) 
‘justice’ as primarily a question of what resources need redistributing to people. 
Fraser suggests that assumptions warranting such claims come increasingly into 
question through globalising forces that unsettle nation-state capacities to meet 
people’s needs and aspirations or attenuate effects of power inequality. In such post-
Westphalian conditions, argues Fraser, the what, who, and how assumptions of 
‘normal justice’ and ‘normal science’ appear inadequate. Summing up the 
inadequacies of claims (1) and (2), Fraser asserts (ibid:68): 
 
[A] theory of justice for abnormal times must reject what I shall call 
“the scientistic presumption” … that decisions about the frame should 
be determined by normal social science …. [N]ormative assumptions 
that necessarily underlie factual claims are themselves in dispute …. 
[M]oreover, what passes in the mainstream for social “science” may 
well reflect the perspectives, and entrench the blindspots, of the 
privileged … [and] risk foreclosing the claims of the disadvantaged 
….Without denying the relevance of social knowledge, [an apt theory 
of justice] must refuse any suggestion that disputes about the “who” be 
settled by “justice technocrats”. 
  
Clearly Fraser’s view of science as a human endeavour does not purchase the 
Durkheimian idea that specialist knowledge workers transcend power-relational 
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partialities through accords and procedures developed among an immense coalition of 
minds across situated times/spaces of scientific effort. This does not mean social 
science knowledge cannot richly inform dialogue and debate over matters of justice. 
However, social science, too, has underpinning frameworks containing perspectival 
blindspots (see also Wagner 1993) often associated with positions of social-structural 
privilege. Hence, social science must not be vested with cloaks of ‘neutrality’ and 
supreme expertise, but rather checked-and-balanced by voices from other situated 
spaces of meaningful contribution to justice discourse. This is all the more so, 
suggests Fraser, under conditions in which globalisation means people outside nation-
state boundaries are increasingly affected by events and decisions within those 
boundaries; and governments and other agencies (national, inter- and supra-national, 
including scientific agencies) have less capacity to control or ameliorate effects. In 
that case, argues Fraser (ibid:27-28): 
 
[G]lobalization cannot help but problematize the question of the 
“how,” as it politicizes the question of the “who”…. [A]s the circle of 
those claiming a say in frame-setting expands, decisions about the 
“who” are increasingly … political matters, which should be handled 
democratically…. The effect is to shift the burden of argument, 
requiring defenders of expert privilege to make their case. No longer 
able to hold themselves above the fray … they must contend with 
demands for meta-political democratization. 
 
Regarding the one-dimensional focus of ‘normal science’ (and SR) on ‘justice’ 
primarily as what-questions of redistribution, Fraser argues historically that emergent 
who and how questions now compel ‘that theories of justice must become three-
dimensional’ (ibid:15). Redistribution, suggests Fraser, was a political focus in post-
WW2 decades of welfare-state attention to poverty as a plight from which ‘the less 
fortunate’ deserved remedy through institutional access to material and cultural 
resources (e.g. policies of ‘equal opportunity’ educational access). However, from the 
1960s, feminist, anti-racist and other social movements brought who questions into 
focus, demanding policy attention to claims for recognition of cultural histories, 
meanings and identities of social groups that had been denied presence and power in 
social institutions (e.g. school curriculum). As we have shown, SRs see recognition 
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claims as ‘relativist’; whereas standpoint theorists value the ‘partial objectivities’ of 
diverse cultural perspectives if engaging other partial perspectives in ‘power-sensitive 
dialogue’. This reflects the third of Fraser’s ‘R’ dimensions, associated with how 
questions: i.e. representation in discussions and decisions that affect lives (e.g. 
curriculum knowledge selection). 
 
These ‘3-R’ dimensions—redistribution, recognition and representation—are 
inextricably linked, argues Fraser, requiring three-fold attention for robust address to 
justice needs and claims. Fraser suggests, from a pragmatist stance, that who and how 
questions of justice entail complex contingencies and cannot be assigned formulaic 
procedures. Instead, she offers flexible meta-principles. Regarding the who of justice, 
Fraser defines a strong inclusion principle: all-subjected (ibid:96): 
 
[T]he all-subjected principle holds that what turns a collection of 
people into fellow members of a public is … their joint subjection to a 
structure … that set[s] the ground rules for their interaction…. [I]n a 
postwestphalian world [we] must reinterpret the meaning of the 
inclusiveness requirement. Renouncing the automatic identification of 
the latter with political citizenship [we] must redraw publicity’s 
boundaries by applying the all-subjected principle directly to the 
question at hand. In this way, the question of “who” emerges from 
under its Westphalian veil.  
 
Entwined with this inclusive who is a how for which the meta-principle is 
participatory parity (ibid:93-94; original italics): 
 
[In what] I shall call the parity condition, all interlocutors must, in 
principle, enjoy roughly equal chances to state their views, place issues 
on the agenda, question the tacit and explicit assumptions of others, 
switch levels as needed, and generally receive a fair hearing. Whereas 
the inclusive condition concerns the question of who is authorized to 
participate in public discussions, the parity condition concerns the 
question of how, in the sense of on what terms, the interlocutors engage 
one another…. [The two principles] go hand in hand. Henceforth, 
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public opinion is legitimate if and only if it results from a 
communicative process in which all who are jointly subjected to the 
relevant governance structure(s) can participate as peers, regardless of 
political citizenship. 
 
Fraser’s post-Westphalian unveiling of who and how questions—yielding the linked 
3-R dimensions and two meta-principles—offers a robust justice framing that (a) is 
congruent with standpoint theory and Vygotskian challenges to SR that we have 
elaborated; and (b) reveals how SR argumentation relies on framing assumptions, 
including philosophical first principles, that can and should be questioned. In our 
concluding section, we address the need, particularly in South Africa, for 
reinvigorated debate about framing in relation to curriculum knowledge selection. 
 
South African curriculum selection—reframing what, who, how? 
‘[T]he politics of framing’, says Fraser, ‘concerns the boundary-setting aspect of the 
political’ (ibid:22); that is, who is included, and how, in ‘the chance to participate … 
[in] authorized contests over justice’—hence ‘the crucial importance of framing to 
every question of social justice’ (ibid:19). This section’s title poses what/who/how 
questions for substantive, long-term debate in South Africa rather than a brief 
concluding section. The question mark in the title poses the meta-political question of 
whether South African curriculum selection will occur within a framing that can 
substantively address a robust range of justice questions. 
 
Our examination of SR’s framing shows a narrow focus mainly on the question of 
what knowledge should be in curriculum. SR’s response addresses the single justice 
dimension of knowledge redistribution—and only of specialist knowledge, not also 
the codes of arbitrarily powerful cultural capital. SR’s rationale for curriculum 
knowledge selection thus sustains Westphalian norms in which specialists are 
custodians of the what, for the who of ‘the population’, with how as the province of 
academic experts and government policy makers. We put the question: does this 
what/who/how satisfy what diverse South African groups need from education? We 
have argued—invoking standpoint theorists, Vygotskians, and Fraser—that a broader 
framing is vital, registering Fraser’s three dimensions and two meta-principles. 
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Broader framing is especially crucial for a region simultaneously striving politically 
towards post-colonial social arrangements, and engagement with post-Westphalian 
inter- and trans-nationalisms—all of which must take up ethical responsibility for 
inclusive participation of diverse and significant population groups who have suffered 
long histories of institutional disenfranchisement. 
 
Regarding the what of justice, we have argued that robust curriculum justice needs to: 
(a) redistribute power-elite cultural capital to those who do not inherit it through birth; 
(b) distribute the systematising use-value of powerful knowledge (as SRs advocate); 
and (c) connect powerful knowledge dialectically with funds of knowledge that carry 
use-values of diverse social-cultural groups—giving ethical pride of place to such 
FoK. This is a what that honours meaningful cultural diversity across who-groups that 
need recognitional as well as redistributive justice. Regarding the how of 
representation, we stand with Fraser that members of diverse affected groups should 
engage, inclusively and proactively, in power-sensitive democratic dialogue that 
raises participants’ consciousness to assumptions and stakes. Such dialogue would 
disclose both virtues and problems for justice, encoded in diverse groups’ historically 
accumulated cultural ‘knowledge in the blood’ (Jansen 2009), working through 
tensions and contradictions towards stronger South African reconciliations. 
 
Such robust address to the what/how/who of curriculum justice, we argue, brings 
ethics prominently into the frame of curriculum selection, and school curriculum 
work, as a valued learning dimension. In contrast, we have shown how SR brackets 
ethics out, suggesting curriculum is for cognitive-only—not cognitive-cum-ethical—
learning purposes: yielding an oddly sans-ethical version of curricular ‘justice’. We 
argue that schools should create dialogue and activity in which learners engage wider 
social worlds in intellectual-cum-ethical ways, capacitating young people to pursue 
‘the good’—in terms both of distinctive group identities, and across groups—as part-
and-parcel of ‘the true’. Such learning, suggests Moll (2014:94-95), links intellectual 
development to capacities for feeling and imagination: ‘Vygotsky saw a … relation 
between emotions and imagination—between the affective and the intellectual…. [I]t 
is essential to facilitate in [learners] a profound interest in, and emotional engagement 
with, their social worlds through various modes of expression’. (We note that SR 
proponents, in debates we lack space to render, tend towards defensive reactions 
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against critiques calling them to recognise ethical dimensions of educational decision. 
See, for example, Young & Muller 2008 responding to Balarin 2008; Muller 2009 
responding to Hall 2009.) 
 
We appreciate how SR stress on powerfully focused cognitive capacities might appeal 
to South African curriculum developers following the terribly thin ‘everyday 
competencies’ promoted in OBE curriculum. We are also mindful of the difficult 
pragmatics of curriculum design in South African school systems facing great 
challenges for implementing curriculum, and for augmenting teachers’ content and 
pedagogic knowledge—certainly matters for address by policy planners, teacher 
educators, and curriculum-focused staff in schools. Considering all this, we can see 
the attractions of a SR approach in offering disciplinary coherence, against the 
complex ‘liquidities’ (Bauman 2000) of post-Westphalian and post-colonial 
conditions, including the procedural complexities of taking up Fraser’s ‘inclusion’ 
and ‘parity’ principles. However, we argue it is always better to face actually 
presenting complexities in commensurately robust ways, rather than evade or simplify 
those complexities. 
 
We need further to consider the historical matrix of South African struggles for 
knowledge, well preceding 1994. SR does not just enter into a breach left by the failed 
Curriculum 2005 reform. It also enters the long history in which South Africa has 
been a colonial laboratory for the ‘cultural imperialism’ (Said 1993) in which global 
west/north epistemologies have been imposed on the diverse indigenous and 
enslaved-migrant groups who greatly outnumber ‘settler’ groups (see Soudien 2010). 
We suggest the need to reclaim and move forward with the too-quickly bypassed first 
impulse, post-1994, for culturally inclusive education. There are academic and activist 
forces in South Africa that have been waiting to bring this impulse again to the fore: a 
socially redemptive impulse which needs to come into productive dialectic with the 
knowledge-centred impulse that SR has brought to the table. We suggest that South 
Africa, as a post-colonial region within a post-Westphalian globalising world, is ripe 
to become a laboratory for new framings of education: to develop approaches to 
curriculum selection and enactment that consider framing in relation to historic time 
and place; and to engage in discussion/debate about the what/who/how of justice. 
Curriculum development, and curriculum enactment in schools, should take up the 
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project of analysing and debating frames, and of proactive re-framing to enable rich 
realisation of social-epistemological-ethical purposes for schooling and wider social 
life. Such reclamation and forward movement is particularly needed in South Africa, 
where long histories of marginalisation and disenfranchisement of diverse and 
substantial population groups need robust social justice redress. 
 
Much remains to be worked out that has been halting and difficult since the great 
political change of 1994. Debates now need to be opened, not narrowed. SR has 
served important purposes in helping to pull away from a weak OBE curriculum 
orientation. However, capacities for bringing ethics-and-knowledge back into focus 
are now greatly needed, in school and university learning-and-teaching, in non- and 
informal-educational settings, and for democratic dialogue about curriculum among 
educational academics, policy makers and wider publics. Curriculum design, we 
argue, is both a broad social project of great importance to the diverse many, and a 
project for re-contextualisation in practices of schooling. At academic, policy and 
praxis levels, there needs to be inclusive and participatory debate on questions of 
knowledge and curriculum selection. 
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